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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RCTH ,V. SHUPE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 






NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action involving a claim by a con-
tractor against an owner under a cost plus contract 
and Title 38, Chapter 1 of the Utah Code. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court determined that the contractor, 
Roy A. Menlove, d/b/ a Menlove Construction Com-
1 
pany, and the owner of the land, Ruth W. Shupe, had 
entered into a written agreement whereby )ienlove 
was to construct a house upon the owner's lot and 
would be compensated on the basis of cost plus 10%. 
The trial court rejected the owner's contentions (ai 
that there was an oral understanding with respect to 
a maximum cost, and (b) that the contractor should 
be compensated only on a quantum meruit basis. The 
trial court held that Menlove Construction Company 
had substantially performed the promises and obliga-
tions contained in the contract between the parties. 
However, the trial court refused to enter judgment for 
the total amount of the undisputed costs incurred by 
Menlove Construction Company plus IO% thereof. 
and ref used to allow the contractor a new trial for the 
sole purpose of determining damages, and refused to 
allow the contractor an attorney's fee or costs pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 38-1-18, U.C.A. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The contractor seeks a judgment and decree in this 
court awarding to him (a) judgment against the owner 
and a lien against the owner's property in the swn of 
$30,910.45 (which represents the actual costs of con-
struction plus 10%, less the amounts paid by the owner) ; 
(b) judgment on the defendant's Second Cause ~f 
Action in Counterclaim; ( c) a reasonable attorney ·1 
fee and defendant's costs and disbursements, and (d) 
adjudicating that the defendant is entitled to receire 
2 
a judgment in the amount of the defendant's actual 
~osts of construction plus 10% thereof. Alternatively, 
the appeal seeks a new trial solely on the issue of dam-
ages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant is a licensed general contractor 
with 30 years' experience in the construction of resi-
dential property in the Wasatch front area (226). The 
Respondent is the owner of a lot in Salt Lake City 
located at 1208 Yale Avenue. Respondent's husband, 
who conducted the negotiations and acted for Respond-
ent in all relevant negotiations and transactions incident 
to the construction of the house, is a civil engineer 
with 40 years' experience in the construction field 
(160, 161, 174). Mr. Menlove and the Shupes had 
known each other for many years in a social capacity 
pnor to the transaction which is the subject of the 
instant litigation. 
Following preliminary discussions concerning the 
location of the house and the general type of construc-
tion that was involved, the parties executed an agree-
ment, received in evidence as Exhibit I, under the terms 
of which Menlove Construction Company agreed to act 
as general contractor in the construction of a home on 
the basis of being compensated for its cost plus 10%. 
The construction commenced almost immediately. p . 
arhally constructed foundations from one or more 
3 
houses which had been commenced on the lot were 
removed during November, 1962, and the construction 
proceeded through December and into the early month~ 
of 1963. Iiwoices were rendered during the first fe,,1 
months of construction as follows: 
December l, 1962 (Nov. costs) 
January, 1963 (Dec. costs) 
February, 1963 (Jan. costs) 
:March, 1963 (Feb. costs) 
$2,681.07 .Ex. j 
5,249.5-i Ex. 6 
3,976.49 Ex. 6 
3,656.21 Ex. 7 
The Shupe::, issued checks in payment of these imoices. 
While payment of the last invoice was approximately 
20 or 30 days late ( 180, 182), no objection was made 
by the owners of the premises to any of the items con· 
tained in the invoices or to the manner of billing or 
to the amount of the bills, except that a slight adjust· 
ment was made in the hourly rate of .l\lax Menlove after 
the first billing (Ex. 5, p. 2) . 'V ork continued through 
:March and April, 1963, and in the early part of ~lay, 
the contractor sent or delivered to the owner a state· 
ment, received in evidence as Exhibit 8, reflecting an 
amount due at that time of $10,308.64. It appeared 
from this invoice that the total costs of construction 
to the end of April were $25,869.75 (Ex. 8, p. 1). The 
record is uncontradicted that at this time Mr. Shupe 
requested that Mr. Menlove prepare an estimate with 
respect to the total estimated costs of constructwn. 
Max Menlove, superintendent of construction, at the 
direction of Appellant, prepared an analysis of the 
cost balance of the house, and on or about June H. 
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19fi.J<, at a conference attended by the Appellant, 
}Iax ){enlove and l\Ir. Shupe, the figures were re-
ne,,,·ed iu detail. A copy of this informal cost projection 
was received in evidence as Exhibit 64 and the follow-
i I;,( langmige appears at the end of the exhibit in Mr. 
Shupe·s handwritnig: "Sat in conference with Roy 
a11d JUax at office June 14, 1964." It was apparent at 
tbt time that the total cost of construction would be 
~+9.630.00 The costs which were estimated but not 
mcurred at that time appear on Exhibit 64. 
The exhibit indicates that wiring, heating, plumb-
ings, cabinets. linoleum, painting, roofing, windows 
and doors. tile and finishing had not been completed 
at that time. The cost of these items with the cost of 
the car port, fence and finishing the plaster work were 
estimated in detail. The total appearing in the exhibit 
for these items was $12,933. 
The projection then credits the Shupes with $2,-
400.00 paid earlier to Barnes Electric and adds an 
estimated amount for a circular stairway for $500.00, 
for 't balance of $ll,033.00; $1,000.00 is added for the 
contractor's IO%, bringing the total to $47,130.00, 
including the previous billings and the amount pre-
nously paid to Barnes Electric. 
Not only did Mr. and Mrs. Shupe instruct Mr. 
Menlove to proceed to complete the construction as 
~oon as possible, but even after they received this pro-
Jection, the record show~ that they continued to order 
materials and give instructions to the men with respect 
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to various phases of construction and landscapin 
(840, 845). g. 
Nor did the Shupes make any effort to reduce 
costs. The door locks they selected, for example, cost 
$54.10, while the 'Veiser locks used in the ordinarr 
house would cost $3.85 ( 842) . All of the hard war~ 
was extremely expensive (ibid), and of course, the 
hardware is one of the last things to install in a house. 
Prior to the execution of the contract with de· 
fendant, J\ilr. Shupe had considered acting as his own 
general contractor ( 162, 173). The testimony is un· 
disputed that as various bids were obtained from sub· 
contractors incident to the various phases of construe· 
tion, conferences were held with Mr. Shupe with respect 
to such bids ( 292). Mr. Shupe visited the premises 
nearly every day during construction from beginning 
to end (292). He gave repeated and detailed sugges· 
tions to Max Menlove and the employees concerning 
the manner in which the work should be done (292) 
The record is clear that Mr. and Mrs. Shupe approved 
each subcontract for each phase of construction and 
actually selected all of the items of any consequence 
that went into the house. Mr. Shupe designed and 
supervised the installation of an extensive network of 
pipes constituting an underground drainage syste~i 
. fl 
under the basement wall and around the entire pe · 
meter of the outer walls (Ex. 4) . The Shupes selected 
Norman brick, knowing that it was substantially more 
expensive than that ordinarily used (371). They 
6 
selected a special mortar for the brick walls ( 191). 
Mr. Shupe was present when the concrete was being 
poured and was aware of the fact that a portion of 
the house on the lot required the use of a crane and 
a resultant fee for overtime for the operator of the 
cement truck ( 295, 296). The arrangement for com-
pensating Ron Clark, the roofer, was based upon $15 
a square. The arrangement with the roof er was ex-
plained to lVIr. Shupe before roofing commenced ( 197, 
293). l\Ir. Shupe was advised that the painter was to 
be compensated on a time basis ( 248, 249). The Shupes 
participated in the discussions with respect to the kinds 
of finish to be used on the exterior of the premises and 
the colors on the interior. The paint schedule was, in 
fact, prepared by .Mr. Shupe after conferences between 
the architect, George Cannon Young, the Shupe's deco-
rator, Marion Cornwall, and the painter ( 47 4-476). 
As a result of changes made by Mr. Shupe in the deco-
rations of the front entry, mahogany strips were nailed 
anrl removed from the front entry three different times 
(297. 298). The Shupes ordered double laminated 
plasterboard, the most expensive available, for the in-
terior walls ( 204) . Through Barnes Electric, they 
personally selected three furnaces to be used in the 
premises ( 189, 198). They personally selected the 
cabinets from Amherst Cabinet and Mill in Murray 
(187, 188). They picked out the lighting fixtures, the 
type of windows and doors they desired, the tile, the 
linoleum and other floor covering ( 221), the plumbing 
fixtures ( 224) . There was extra cost in the intricate 
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steel work in the foundation ( 368), steel mesh in the 
basement floor ( 371), the bearing walls were con-
structed from 2 x 6 lumber rather than 2 x 4. The floor 
joists were 2 x 12 rather than 2 x 10. There were 
double joists on both floor and ceiling ( 370). T!it 
Shupes admitted that they selected and approved all 
of the costs that went into the house. At his deposition 
Mr. Shupe stated that he was advised as to the rost 
as the work progressed. He testified: " ... of course, 
there was discussion about everything that went inli1 
the place. No doubt there was discussion about it." 
(205). 
Exhibit 4, pp. 355 and 356 reflect Mr. Shupe's 
detailed specifications furnished during the course of 
construction with respect to the reinforcing steel in the 
foundation. The expert witness called by the Shupes 
admitted that whereas approximately 100 pounds of 
steel are used in the foundation of an ordinary house. 
he estimated that between 7,500 and 8,000 pounds were 
used in the Shupe residence ( 364). Each piece of steel 
had to be hand tied before the foundation was poured 
( 365). He suggested that the amount of steel in this 
structure would hold up "a pretty tall building." (366). 
The record is replete with instances where the 
Shupes revised plans and made changes and additions 
I · b ond to the structure as construction ensued. t is ey 
't · these the scope of this brief to attempt to 1 enuze 
changes and additions in detail. Max Menlove, the 
superintendent of construction, stated that there were 
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at least 100 changes ap.d additions ( 885). The Shupes 
made no effort to controvert this testimony. 
The record is undisputed that the men employed 
by Menlove Construction Company who worked upon 
the premises kept records with respect to their time 
and were compensated on the same basis as they were 
f'Ompensated in all other construction by the company. 
There is not a shred of evidence that any men charged 
auy time to the job which was not actually spent work-
ing on the job. There is no evidence that as much as a 
stick cf lumber went into the house that was not called 
for by the plans or the direct order of owners. 
Some time during the end of the summer, after 
:Nlr. and Mrs. Shupe had moved into a basement apart-
ment in the house, they instructed Mr. Menlove that 
they did not desire him to complete the work. Mr. 
Menlove ,_·equested a payment on the account, remind-
ing them that it had been substantially six months since 
he had received any money (Ex. 9). When no payment 
was n~ceived, Mr. Menlove filed a mechanic's lien on 
November 5, 1963, pursuant to the provisions of Title 
38, Chapter l of the Utah Code, in the amount of 
~30,910.40 (Ex. 62). Notice of the claim was pub-
lished in the Salt Lake Times in accordance with the 
statute (Ex. 63). 
W"hen the Shupes learned that Mr. Menlove had 
filed a lien and intended to insist upon his rights under 
the contract and under the lien statute, they filed the 
complaint in this action alleging that Mrs. Shupe 
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owned the property in question, that they had entered 
into an agreement with the defendant, copy of which 
was attached, and that they realized that they owed 
Mr. Menlove some money but did not know how mucb 
it was. They asked the court that defendant be required 
to prove and show the amount which he claimed to 
be due and to determine the amount of the indebted-
ness. The defendant filed a counterclaim in his First 
Cause of Action that the plaintiff was indebted to 
him in the amount of $30,910.45; that he had complied 
with the requirements of 38-1-7 of the Utah Code, and 
that he was entitled to a lien and the other remedies 
provided under the statute. In a Second Cause of 
Action, he prayed for judgment in the amount of his 
costs plus 10%, pursuant to the provisions of the con-
tract. 
At the request of Mr. and Mrs. Shupe, Mr . .Men-
love turned over to the Shupes' certified public ac-
countant all of his invoices, records, checks and other 
data concerning the costs incurred on the Yale Avenue 
house ( 249, 250). These records were delivered some· 
time in the fall of 1963 ( 255, 256). More than a year 
later, on December 16, 1964, Mrs. Shupe answered a 
written interrogatory by the defendant as follows: 
"Q. Itemize in detail the expenses which plaintiff 
claims were unnecessarily incurred by def ~n~~; 
as alleged in paragraph number 7 of plamt1 s 
complaint. 
"A. Plaintiff is unable at the present time to 
IO 
itemize in detail the expenses which were unneces-
sarily incurred by the defendant ... " (27). 
At the trial, the plaintiff took two positions: (I) 
that there was an oral understanding to the effect that 
the total cost of construction would not exceed $35,-
~00.00. and ( 2) that Menlove Construction Company 
did not substantially perform its agreement; therefore 
it was entitled to receive damages only on a quantum 
meruit basis. (See plaintiff's trial memorandum, 46, 
50). 
The court determined at the conclusion of plain-
ciff's evidence on defendant's motion, that there was 
11:.i evidence to support plaintiffs first position. The 
trial judge determined that based upon the admissions 
of Mr. Shupe on cross-examination, the plaintiff had 
~onceded that there was no oral agreement placing a 
limit upon the cost of construction ( 487, 488). Plain-
tiff has filed no protective motions with respect to 
sud1 ruling and it must be conceded on this appeal that 
the trial judge's ruling on this point was correct. The 
case was submitted to the jury upon special interroga-
tories submitted by the plaintiff (126, 7). In its answer 
tn the first interrogatory, the jury determined that 
Menlove Construction Company had substantially 
perfoiwed its obligations under the contract. The 
factual determination upon this question, therefore, 
is adverse to the plaintiff's position, and since Mrs. 
Shupe has made no effort to obtain a new trial, or to 
otherwise complain of the jury's verdict, it must be 
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conceded on this appeal that such finding is binding 
upon her. 
The jury determined, notwithstandmg the un-
disputed evidence with respes_t to the actual costs of 
Menlove Construction Company, that the costs incurred 
in the construction of the structure was $43,000.00 
( 133) . It determined further than an off set should 
be allowed to plaintiff because of defective construction 
and delay in the sum of $1230 (ibid). 
Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwith· 
standing the verdict to the effect that the defendant's 
cost plus lOJ'o was in the sum of $49,461.56, or in the 
alternative, $49,061.56, on the ground that the verdict 
as returned by the jury was contrary to the evidence 
and the weight of the evidence, and that the jury 
failed to follow the court's instructions with respect 
to the applicable interrogatory, and that the evidence 
conclusively established said amount to be defendant's 
costs of construction and that there was no evidence 
to the contrary. The defendant further moved that 
the court fix a reasonable amount to be awarded to 
the defendant as attorney's fees pursuant to the pro· 
visions of 38-1-18 U.C.A., and that judgment be en· 
tered in favor of the defendant on both of his causes 
of action in the sum of $30,910.45 plus interest, costs 
and such reasonable attorney's fees (134). The trial 
judge denied the motions. Defendant then moved for 
a new trial solely on the question of damages, upon 
the grounds, among others, that the verdict of the jury 
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was against the weight of the evidence and that inade-
quate damages were given under the influence of pas-
sion or prejudice ( 140). The defendant's position on 
the motion for new trial was substantially that a great 
part of the evidence in the case was directed to the 
question of recovery on a quantum meruit basis and 
that such evidence was wholly inadmissible and irrele-
rnnt in determining defendant's cost plus 10'/o. The 
jury's finding with respect to damages necessarily re-
flected the fact that it had considered evidence in the 
Cll.se which was introduced by plaintiff in support of 
her claim on quantum meruit in determining the ques-
tion as to d~f endant's actual costs of construction plus 
lO(/~. Defendant argued that in view of the fact that 
the <iury had determined that the defendant substan-
tially performed his contract and defendant was pre-
par<:d to concede an offset in the amount represented 
by the jury's findings, to-wit: $1230., defendant should 




THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ENTER A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTAND-
ING THE VERDICT WITH RESPECT TO 
THE ANS,VER TO 'VRITTEN INTERROGA-
TORY 2-B IN THE SUM OF $49,461.56, OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE THE AMOUNT OF 
$49,061.56. ' 
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The law is clear that where an owner has agreed ! 
to compensate a contractor for construction on a cost 
plus basis, that the contractor is entitled to recover 
his actual costs plus the designated fee or percentage 
of costs, whichever formula is applicable. Shafer et al. 
v. Lee, (1917) 64 Okla. 106, 166 P. 94, and see 10 I 
I 
Am. J ur. 15, Building and Construction Contracts ' 
I ' 
Sec. 20, and 17 A C.J.S. 367 (2) for general discussion I 
of cost plus contracts. : 
There is no dispute in the instant case at this 
juncture of the proceeding that Menlove Construction 
Company is entitled to be compensated for its costs 
plus 10% based upon the agreement of November 2, 
1 
1962 between the parties (Ex. l) . The crux of the 
problem is whether the trier of facts should be per· 
mitted to stubbornly ignore and refuse to be guided , 
by competent, credible and uncontradicted evidence 
with respect to the Appellant's costs. This case must 
be distinguished from Arnold Machinery Co. v. lntru· ' 
sionPrepakt,Inc., (1960) 11 Ut.(2d) 246,237P. (2d) 
496. In that case plaintiff had leased to defendant a 
compressor unit to be used on a construction job. The 
compressor burned out because of lack of lubrication 
and overheating. The burning out was due to an oh· 
structed oil line caused by a brass cutting. There was 
evidence that the plaintiff had included in his state· 
ment "numerous and substantial charges for other ex· 
penses connected with the repair of the machinery, , 
d · g of such as travel, telephone costs, freight an towm . 
equipment back and forth". This court held that if 
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the jury was bound to accept plaintiff's evidence at face 
value and render a verdict exactly in accordance with 
1ts claims, the defendant might, in some instances, be 
"quite at plaintiff's mercy". The court pointed out that 
the repairs made on the machine "lay solely within the 
plaintiff's knowledge". 
In the instant case, the actual construction costs 
were controlled by the Shupes. It is undisputed that 
the Shupes waited until the house was nearly com-
pleted and until the contractor obligated himself to 
his own laborers, materialmen, suppliers and subcon-
tractors before they even notified him that they had 
any complaints. After requiring Mr. Menlove to 
extend himself in giving his own credit to subcontrac-
tors and actually paying most of them, the finder of 
fact should not be in the position of putting him at 
the Shupes' mercy. Mr. Shupe admitted that "there 
was discussion about everything that went into the 
place". The costs were incurred under his active direc-
tion. The entire conduct of the Shupes is inconsistent 
with any good faith claim that they seriously contested 
any of the costs which Menlove Construction Com-
pany actually incurred in the construction of this house. 
In fact, until the present time, the Appellant has 
never been advised as to what specific items of cost 
are being disallowed. The Shupes and their certified 
public accountant had access to all of the defendant's 
records between the fall of 1963 and at least the middle 
of November, 1964. The trial was held in early March, 
15 
1965. In the year and a half that the Shupes and their 
counsel and accountant had access to these records 
they were unable to suggest even one item which should 
not properly be charged as a cost of construction. 
The first four billings were paid. Certainly the 
Shupes cannot be heard to object that the hourly rate 
of the employees of Menlove Construction Company 
was objectionable because these rates were itemized 
in the statements, and the amounts represented by 
costs based on such rates were a pp roved and paid. 
Shupes cannot suggest that any amounts paid for 
subcontractors were excessive or did not represent 
actual costs of construction. The record shows that the 
Shupes actually approved each subcontract, either as 
to the actual amount of the bid or the method of billing 
or the precise portion of the construction involved. ~o 
particular purpose is served by reference to the eri-
dence with respect to each of these subcontracts. The 
Appellant has never been advised and does not now 
know what subcontracts, if any, are objectionable in-
sofar as the Shupes were concerned or insofar as the 
findings of the jury of the lower court reflect any 
possible dissatisfaction with any particular item. In 
this respect, the Appellant is fighting a shadow. H~ 
actual costs of construction, as clearly reflected by his 
records and the proof of payment to his employees 
and to suppliers and subcontractors, is nearly $6,500 
more than he was awarded by the jury. The defendant 
has no way of knowing what subcontractors should 
16 
not be paid. Should l\Ir. Menlove refuse to pay Am-
herst Cabinet & Mill, who is now threatening a lawsuit 
against him for the total amount of the cabinets which 
were actually selected by Shupes and installed at their 
request! Should he withhold payment from the painter 
who worked under the direct supervision of Mr. and 
}Irs. Shupe and their decorator? Should he attempt 
to recoup payment by the brickmasons who were selected 
by the Shupes and who approved the brick and the 
amount of brick bid? The evidence shows that the 
Shupes actually consulted with Barnes Electrical per-
~onnel and accepted their suggestions with respect to 
the type of furnaces to be installed in the house and 
the fixtures that were to be used. Can this court say 
that l\lr. Menlove is obligated to pay Barnes Electric 
for these items and that the Shupes are not liable to 
him for them? 
The inequity of the lower court's determinations 
is reflected by paragraph 9 of the judgment {139). 
Judge Anderson determined that Mr. Menlove was 
obligated to pay all of the laborers, materialmen and 
subcontractors in the amounts reflected in the invoices, 
Exhibits .5 through 12. This amount, without allowance 
of a single dime to l\Ir. Menlove for his overhead or 
profit, would be approximately $45,000. Yet the amount 
awarded to Mr. Menlove before any deduction reflected 
by the offset, would be only $43,000. (Compare para-
graph 9 of the decree, 139, with the jury's answer to 
Interrogatory No. 1, 133). 
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It appeared at the trial that the Appellant was 
a co-owner of Apex Lumber Company. Apex was 
organized as a cooperative. I ts billing arrangements 
with .Mr. l\ilenlove was on the basis of its cost pllli 
10%. Five percent of said 10% was represented br 
the actual expense of doing business of Apex Lumbe;, 
and the other 5% was represented by a contribution 
to capital. The plaintiff's own expert testified that the 
cost of materials in the house was reasonable and com-
petitive and was not excessive ( 357, 361) . Obviously. 
therefore, since Apex Lumber supplied the materia~ 
of the total invoice value of $7,489.89, the cost of such 
materials cannot be said to be unreasonable or exces-
sive. Leaning over backwards, however, the Appellant 
stated in open court at the trial that if the 5% charged 
by Apex as contribution to capital was not deemed 
to be a cost within the contemplation of the parties. 
he would consent to a reduction of his claim m the 
amount of 5% of the total Apex bill. Thus on his 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, be 
suggested alternatively that the total cost of construe· 
tion be reduced $400 from the $49,461.56 represented 
by the billings. 
Appellant suggests that the result achieved in 
this case, if the determinations of the trial court stand, 
is that Mr. and Mrs. Shupe enjoyed the benefits of 
a house which was actually paid for by .Mr. Menlove 
in the sum of more than $6,000. 
It is submitted that Arnold Machinery Co., supra, 
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doe5 not support this result. The case of American 
Smleillf.<J. v. Zee (1951) 120 Ut. 402, 2:-35 P (2d) 361, 
is more applicable to the present case than Arnold Ma-
chincr,IJ Cu., supra. In American Scale 1llfg. case, 
the ('(lurt q uote<l with approval the following: 
"'Vhere the testimony of a witness is uncon-
tradicted and not inherently improbable, and 
there are no circumstances tending to raise a 
doubt of its truth, the facts so proven should be 
taken as conclusively established and verdict on 
decision entered accordingly." 
It is certainly conceivable that there are situations 
where a contractor claims reimbursement for costs that 
11ere not actually incurred. It is certainly conceivable 
that aE owner may have offsets against a contractor 
as :i result of negligence or construction delays or 
!lung' of that kind. In the instant case, the jury found 
that an offset existed against .Mr. l\lenlove in the sum 
1 f ,i;,1:230.00, and while the Appellant does not believe 
th~t this amount is justified in view of the failure of 
the Slmpes · evidence to distinguish between purported 
negligence in construction and the items which were 
unfinished because Shupes prevented the completion 
oi the project, the Appellant does not quarrel with 
the $1230 figure. -
Appellant suggests, however, that the law does 
not and should not sanction the conduct of the Shupes 
m the instant case. The Shupes determined the con-
tractor's costs; they selected the plan of construction; 
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they were responsible for certain increased expenses 
by reason of the inad~quacies of the original plan and 
changes in the plans made during construction; the\ 
selected the materials and all the materials they selected 
were the most expensive that were available. They knew 
the actual costs of construction as the various phases 
were decided upon and completed. Then when the job 
was done, after they had moved into the house, and 
after they knew that the defendant had obligated him-
self to pay contractors and laborers and materialmen 
for the building which they had chosen, they decided 
to attempt to impale defendant upon his own laxness 
in failing to insist upon payment as work progressed 
during construction. 
Appellant suggests that the jury's determination 
is totally arbitrary. Appellant does not suggest that the 
jury was "obliged to follow abjectively the [defend· 
ant's] evidence". (cf. Arnold Machinery at 497 Pacific 
Reporter). But the jury is required to follow some 
evidence. If there were specific individual items of 
cost which the defendant should not be awarded, or 
which were not incurred, or as to which there was a 
dispute in the evidence, the jury might well have re· 
duced from the contractor's claim such items which 
were the subject of such evidence or dispute. But the 
Shupes presented no such specific evidence. There were 
no specific items ever placed in dispute. If such items 
were placed in dispute it is impossible to come to a 
rational conclusion that the jury resolved the dispute 
in favor of Shupes. The jury could not find from the 
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eridence that Mr. Menlov:e's costs just happened to 
be the round figure of $43,000. Appellant suggests 
that the finders of fact in the instant case simply im-
posed an unreasoning imposition of their will upon 
the defendant and that such conduct "is the essence 
of tyranny and the antithesis of justice". (Arnold, 
supra, at 479 Pac.) . 
The case was presented to the jury on the theory 
that if the defendant substantially performed the obli-
gations described under the contract, he was entitled 
to recover his costs plus 10%, less any offsets or credits 
which the jury determined were to be allowed the 
plamtiff. There was no actual issue with respect to 
plaintiff's costs plus 10%. The posture of the parties 
and the position of the court was made clear from the 
conduct reflected in the record in connection with the 
ruling on defendant's motions and the instructions 
given to the jury. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, for in-
stance, defendant asked the court to determine that 
as a matter of law there was no competent evidence 
from which the jury could find that the defendant had 
not substantially performed his contract and that the 
defendant therefore should be awarded judgment in 
the amount represented by his invoices, or in the alter-
native, the amount of the invoices less 5% of the Apex 
Lumber billing. The court indicated in ruling on the 
motion that he was submitting the question of sub-
stantial performance to the jury. The court stated 
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explicitly, however, "If the jury should determine that 
there was substantial performance, why then there 
would be only the question of off set." ( 489). In the 
court's Instruction No. 10 the jury was advised that 
Menlove Construction Company had the burden to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that it substau-
tially complied with the terms of the contract. If that 
burden was satisfied, then the plaintiff had the bnrden 
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiff is entitled to some offsets or credits again~! 
the cost of construction plus 10% thereof which Men-
love Construction Company is entitled to receive under 
the terms of its agreement ( 103). Substantial perform· 
ance was described in Instruction No. 19: 
"A building contractor is entitled to recover 
under the terms of his contract only if he has 
substantially performed his part of the bargain. 
In this case the defendant's performance has 
been put in issue, and the burden of proof is 
upon the defendant to establish that he did per· 
form substantially as agreed, or that he was 
prevented from doing so by plaintiff. To estab· 
lish substantial performance, the defendant must 
prove, by a preponderance of the evid.ence that 
he (I) exercised reasonable skill and JU~grnent 
in letting subcontracts, in performing his own 
work, and in supervising his workmen a~d ~uh· 
contractors; ( 2) performed the construct10n ma 
reasonable time; ( 3) rendered statements read 
sonably; and ( 4) exerted his best efforts towar 
constructing the Shupe residence at the most 
reasonable cost possible." ( ll2). 
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Again in Instruction No. 20, the jury was advised 
that if it determined that defendant construction com-
pany had substantially performed the written contract, 
that it was entitled to receive its costs of labor and 
materials plus 10%. 
"On the other hand, if the defendant fails to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he substantially performed the written contract 
between the parties, then the defendant contrac-
tor is not entitled to recover the cost of labor 
and material plus 10% agreed to but may recover 
only the reasonable cost of the materials and 
labor which have been incorporated into the 
home, and without allowance for the IO fee% 
of the contractor." (113). 
It is, of course, true that the defendant had the 
burden of proving the amount of his costs. But in the 
instant case. the defendant's invoices were actually 
introduced by the plaintiff ( 172) . Plaintiff actually 
proved defendant's costs herself. She proved defend-
ant's method of recording invoices and time costs and 
she proved that the same kind of records, including 
time records, were kept on the Shupe job as on other 
construction projects of the defendant (289). It is 
hornbook law that a party is bound by its own evidence. 
32 CJS p. 1104, Evidence, Section 1040. The same 
rule applies where the evidence is adduced from an 
~dverse witness, particularly unless such testimony 
Is contradicted by credible evidence (ibid, p. 1107, 
et seq. Sec. 1040 (b). Thus plaintiff effective-
ly has conceded the amount of the cost plus 10%. 
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The parties and the court all proceeded on the assump-
tion that if the contractor substantially performed, 
as the jury found he did, his damages were liquidated 
No evidence was introduced to show or to tend to 
show that the costs reflected by these invoices were net 
actually incurred. On the contrary, the evidenre 
adduced by .Mrs. Shupe was all directed toward the 
point that defendant had not reasonably performed the 
contract and that he was entitled to recover only on 
a quantum meruit theory. The trial court conceded 
on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict that 
"If the jury should determine that there was substan· 
tial performance, why then there would be only the 
question of offset" ( 489). 
Inasmuch as the jury found without equivocation 
that Menlove Construction Company substantiall)· 
performed the obligations described under the contract. 
the trial court should have granted defendant's motion 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the total 
amount of defendant's costs plus his 10/1c. Appellant 
admits, for the purpose of argument on this appeal. 
that the jury's finding of allowing plaintiff an offset 
in the amount of $1230 is supportable from the evi· 
dence and that such amount should be deducted from 
the net judgment awarded against the plaintiff. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO , 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN· 




Defendant requested that the court give instruc-
tions number 3 and 4 as follows: 
"Instruction No. 3 
The defendant in this action, Roy A. Menlove, 
entered into a written contract with the plaintiff, 
Ruth 1V. Shupe, on the 2nd day of November, 
1962, which has been received in evidence in this 
case as Exhibit 1. This agreement was in the 
nature of a cost plus contract. The parties agreed 
that the defendant was to receive for his services 
as a general contractor in building the house in 
question in this litigation all of his costs plus a 
fee of 10% of the cost of construction. Your sole 
duty and prerogative as jurors in this lawsuit is 
to determine the total cost of construction of the 
house and to add 10% of such cost, such total 
being the amount which the defendant is entitled 
to recover on each of his causes of action." 
"Instruction No. 4 
You are instructed that there is nothing illegal 
or improper about a cost plus contract. If the 
owners of the premises agree to pay a contractor 
his entire costs of constructing a house plus a 
percentage of such costs for the contractor's 
services, the contractor is entitled to recover all 
of such costs plus the percent agreed upon. In 
the case before vou: the evidence is uncontra-
dicted that the defendant's costs are in the sum 
of$ ________________ , The agreement between the parties 
provided that the defendant was entitled to re-
cover these costs plus an additional 10% thereof 
for his services." 
(Defendant offered to fill the blank in Instruction 
No. 4, but since the court indicated that he would refuse 
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the instruction, the blank was not completed at the 
time.) 
The jury determined that the defendant ~ub~ta 11 
tially performed the contract. Appellant submits, thert· 
fore, that Instruction No. 3 is a correct statement uf 
the law with respect to the subject matter involre11 
and that the instruction should have been given. Cer· 
tainly with respect to interrogatory 3 the jury should 
have been instructed directly and succinctly that their 
sole prerogative was to determine the total cost of con· 
struction and to add 10% to such costs. The jury 
should have been instructed in substance and effect 
that they should not be permitted to speculate as t<i 
what the cost might have been by some other persou 
in building the house. In view of the fact that eridm.t 
was received in the case on a quantum meruit theory. 
the giving of this instruction in the instant case was of 
particular significance. 
Appellant submits that Instruction No. 4 cor· 
rectly and succinctly states the law applicable to the 
posture of the parties in the instant case. Appellant 
suggests that the Respondent will not even argue upon 
appeal that the contractor is not entitled to recow 
costs plus 10% in the instant litigation. The defendant 
was entitled to a precautionary instruction that there 
is nothing illegal or improper about a cost plus con· 
tract and the jurors should have been aware of the 
legal proposition that when an owner agrees to pay 
a contractor for the costs plus a designated percentage 
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that the owner is bound to make such payment. The 
contractor certainly cannot be led down a primrose 
path into believing that he will be compensated for 
the items actually selected by the owner and then be 
required to pay for them himself. The advantages in 
cost plus contracts are to be weighed against the dis-
advantages at the time the contract is made, not after 
a house is constructed. In view of the fact that there 
has been some popular discredit of cost plus contracts, 
particularly in government projects in this area, the 
failure of the court to give the instruction in the instant 
case constituted prejudicial error. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ADMIT INTO EYIDENCE DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED EXHIBIT NUMBER 67. 
The plaintiff introduced evidence on her theory 
of the case with respect to the quantum meruit theory 
of recovery. Her expert witness was substantially 
impeached upon cross examination but the testimony 
he gave could easily have the effect of diverting the 
jury's attention from the real issue in the case, namely, 
the cost of construction incurred by Mr. Menlove. 
To assist the jury in understanding the actual 
costs of construction as they related to the different 
phases of the building operation, defendant offered 
Exhibit 67. It is filed with this brief as Appendix A 
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( 866, 867). This exhibit is an analysis of all of .:lli 
Menlove's costs applied to all of the rnrious phasts 
of construction. It was prepared by Max :\Ienlor" 
the superintendent on the job, in conjunction with ]i1, 
study of the invoices and time records in existence and 
his knowledge of what phases of construction were 
completed during the times reflected in the origin:il 
records. This exhibit makes more understandable the 
actual invoices because it relates the labor and material 
costs in the invoices to the particular phases of con· 
struction described in the exihbit. 
Plaintiff's counsel objected to the exhibit on th" 
ground that it was hearsay and that it would give undue 
emphasis to the testimony of the witness on the q_uestinn 
of damages ( 867). Appellant submits that the ob Jee· 
tion is invalid under the circumstances of this cn>e. 
Section 78-25-12(5) U.C.A. provides that an exception 
exists to the parole evidence rule: 
" ... when the original costs of numeruu1 
accounts or other documents which cannot be 
examined in court without great loss of time. anJ 
the evidence sought from them is only the general 
result of the whole." 
Exhibit 67 arranges the information contained in Ex· 
hibits 5 through 12 in an orderly fashion so that i' 
could have been understood by the jury. It is submitted 
that the trial court's error in refusing to receiYe the 
exhibit was particularly prejudicial in the instant case. 
inasmuch as the jury determined that Mr. :Menlore 
substantially performed his obligations. The sole and 
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critical remaining question was simply the cost of con-
struction. The jury should have been afforded an oppor-
tuff.ty to have a compilation of the numerous invoices, 
tune sheets and other data contained in Exhibits 5 
through 12 for use in its deliberations. Prejudice is 
particularly apparent from the result in the instant 
l':tSe, since it is clear that the jury did not and could 
not have arrived at its figure of damages from rational 
considerations or objective examination of the evidence 
itself. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
.\WARD DEFENDANT REASONABLE AT-
TORNEY'S FEES. 
Section 38-1-18 Utah Code Annotated provides 
that in any action brought to enforce a lien under Chap-
ter l of Title 38, the Mechanics' Lien chapter, "the suc-
eessful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in this action." In the instant case de-
fendant's counterclaim was brought under the statute. 
The counterclaim was anticipated by the complaint; 
in fact, the complaint was only a procedural device 
to be first in court. Plaintiff knew full well she was 
indebted to defendant; she didn't know, so she said, 
how much she owed. Plaintiff had never offered to 
pay more than $35,200 prior to the bringing of the 
action. She had not, in fact, actually tendered any sum 
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in~o court and she steadfastly maintained during the 
trial that she was not bound by the written agreemen•, 
she signed with the defendant. 
The trial judge refused to award attorney's fee> 
on the theory that the contractor was not totalk sue· 
cessful in that the jury's answer to Interrogato;y 2·B 
was approximately $6500 less than the amounts r~· 
ceived by his invoices and costs. It is submitted that 
even if this court should determine that the jury's 
verdict can stand, Mr. Menlove was the successful 
party to the extent of substantially $8,000.00. 
The ruling of the trial court would mean that in 
any case where a contractor attempted to enforce a 
lien under the statute, if he should be awarded less than 
the amount he claimed, he would not recover an attor· 
ney's fee. Appellant suggests that such result is nut 
in accordance with the spirit or intention of the statute. 
The result does not conform with the risks undertaken 
by the parties when the agreement was executed. The 
interpretation of the act by the trial court substantialh 
thwarts the intention of the Legislature in that it 
denies a contractor a reasonable attorney's fee where 
he is required to litigate the lien. Such an interpretation 
places a premium upon refusing to pay the amounts 
owed to contractors, materialmen, laborers and others 
for whose benefit the Mechanic's Lien statute was de· 
signed. In the instant case, the very ambivolence ~nd 
. f 1 . 'ff' I . reqmred uncertamty of the nature o p amt1 s c aim 
far greater effort in the preparation of the trial than 
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would have been necessary if the plaintiff had even 
~~much as indicated what particular costs she objected 
h The reasons for the allowance of a fee are particu-
larly cogent. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
.-\..ND THEREFORE ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT TO DEFENDANT A NR\V TRIAL 
SOLELY ON THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES. 
Appellant has established in Points I, II and III 
of this brief that the trial court committed error. Appel-
lant was, therefore, entitled on the grounds argued 
in prior portions of the brief, to a new trial pursuant 
to the provisions of Rule 59. The new trial should be 
granted only to the issue of damages since Mrs. Shupe 
is foreclosed on the two substantial points involved in 
her presentation of evidence in the instant case, to-wit, 
her contention that there was an agreed limit on the 
amount of costs plus the applicable percentage, and 
that 1\Ir. Menlove did not substantially perform the 
obligations under the contract. 
Aside, however, from the errors suggested in the 
first three points of the brief, Mr. Menlove should be 
awarded a new trial upon the ground that the amount 
of the jury's verdict was inadequate. In United Press 
Associations v. National Newspapers Association ( CCA 
8: 1918) 254 F. 284, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a 
situation where the substantive rights had been deter-
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mined in prior proceedings. The jury had returned . 
~ a 
verdict which ignored the instructions of the court and 
awarded damages in a nominal amount; whereas tlie 
evidence showed that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
ceive substantial damages. The trial court had faiierl 
to grant a motion for a new trial. The Circuit hel<l 
that the failure to grant a new trial was reversible 
error. 
"~t is our opinion that the trial judge, being 
an mtegral part of the court, charged with !ht 
duty and responsibility of seeing that iustice 
was administered between the parties, ~hould 
have granted a new trial, and that his failure to 
do so was an abuse of his discretion." 
In the United Press Associations case the court 
referred to the fact that there was certain evidence 
from which the jury may have been confused witl1 
respect to the amount of damages due. In that ca~'. 
the vice president of plaintiff had sent a telegram before 
the suit was instituted expressing his view that damages 
would be only in the sum of $500. The court held that 
such telegram was not binding upon the plaintiff a!ld 
could not be used to reduce the sum of damages actuall)· 
proved to said amount. 
In the instant case there was evidence from whicli 
the jury could have been substantially confused with 
respect to the damages recoverable under the cost plus 
agreement. Counsel for l\frs. Shupe elicited informa· 
tion from one of the witnesses from which it appeared 
that certain materialmen and subcontractors had not 
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been paid by Mr. Menlove. The amount due to these 
subcontractors was approximately $6,500.00. {257). 
Perhaps it is no accident that the jury's verdict was 
c1pproximately $6500 less than the total amount re-
tiected bv the invoices (Ex. 5-12 inclusive) . Appellant 
submits, moreover, that the testimony of Carl Ohran 
could have led the jury into error in the matter of 
determining the contractor's cost plus 103. Mr. Ohran 
was called as an expert witness by Mrs. Shupe for the 
purpose of making an estimate of the reasonable cost 
of construction of the house. Such evidence was totally 
irrelevant to the question of the costs of Menlove Con-
struction Company. It did not take into account the 
numerous and repeated changes made by the Shupes 
during the course of construction, nor was the witness 
able to state what portion of the figure he allocated for 
labor upon the various labor costs that went into the 
building. However, his testimony was before the jury at 
+he time they were considering damages. As in the 
r·nited Press Associations case, this kind of evidence 
might easily have confused the jury on the precise issue 
they were called upon to determine. 
In Boden v. Suhrmann (1958) 8 Ut. (2d) 42, 327 
P. (2d) 826, the majority of this court held that where 
"the verdict is outside the limits of what appears jus-
tificable under the evidence, to the extent that it should 
not be permitted to stand ... the remedy is a modifi-
cation of the verdict to bring it within the evidence; 
~nd the adverse party is given the choice of accepting 
It or taking a new trial." The majority's opinion in 
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example number 2 described a situation where a de 
fendant was liable and there was no dispute as tr 
the amount of the damages. The court indicated thai 
in such event, the court should order the verdict iii 
creased to the correct amount or permit a new trial. 
Appellant recognizes that there was a vigorolli 
dissenting opinion in the Boden case, but Appellant 
suggests that the relief which the Appellant seeks 111 
the instant action is within the rationale of both the 
majority, the concurring opinion, and the dissenting 
op1mons. 
In the case at bar, the liability of the owner of thr 
home under the cost plus contract was positively estah· 
lished by the jury's answer to Interrogatory Xo. 1. As 
stated in Point I of the brief, the case was tried upon 1;1e 
theory that if the contractor's performance substantially 
satisfied the contract he was entitled to the full amo11n1 
of his claim less any off sets which the owner established 
Such offset was found by the jury and is not disputed 
here. Appellant suggests that the inconsistency betwee11 
the amount awarded to the Appellant as his costs plus 
103 and the jury's response to Interrogatory Xo. 1 
indicates that the jury was confused or misled upon 
the question of damages or that its verdict indicates 
passion or prejudice, and that the trial court should. 
· · of have granted a new trial pursuant to the prons10ns 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. cf. 89 
Am. Jur. p. 155, New Trial Section 148 and authorities 
cited. 
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SCMl\IARY AND CONCLUSION 
This is a case where the jury fairly and properly 
determined the substantive rights of the parties but 
brc:ame confused and misled upon the appropriate meas-
ure of recovery. Since the case was tried upon the basic 
theory that if the jury found that the defendant con-
tractor substantially performed his obligations he would 
be entitled to the amount of costs which he claimed, plus 
a percentage thereon, and inasmuch as there was no 
objection to any single item of cost, the trial court should 
ha,·e corrected the jury's verdict and awarded an amount 
in accordance with the contractor's claim on the defen-
dant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. Failing this, the court should have granted a new 
~rial on the sole issue of damages so that the issues 
couid have been tried in an atmosphere free from the" 
obfuscating evidence involved in a determination of 
the substantive questions. 
In any event, the defendant is entitled to an award 
ot' LJttorney·s fees under Section 38-1-18 of the Utah 
l'0de. Appellant submits that even if this court should 
decide that it is unable to determine from the record 
the defendant's actual costs of construction, defendant 
should be awarded a new trial where the attention of the 
Jurr could be focused solely upon what would then be 
the only relevant issue. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2~ti, 
day of November, 1965. 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN and 
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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Exl1ibit D 07 J\PPENDIX A 
CONSTHUCTION COST BREAKDO,'VN 
A. Clearin.q and Ea'cavation of Lot: 
I ... Menlove Constr. (Cat., clearing lot, loading soil, breaking & 
loading old foundation & grading) 
2. Trucks (hauling trees, soil, found.) 
3. Rulon Denney (breaking found. & ftg.) 
~ 4. Menlove Const. (labor & supervision 2500 yards moved) 
'-] 
B. Drain Around and Under House: 
I. Menlove Constr. (labor & suprvn) 
2. Int. Pipe & Ceramics (drain pipe) 
3. Utah Sand & Gravel (drain gravel) 
4. Menlove Constr. (hauling gravel & excavated soil) 













C. Subcontractors and Material Suppliers On Job: 
I. Heatrite Eng. (hood kit fan) 
2. Terrazo Rods (front entry) 
3. Flowers Plumbing (sewer & water line installation) 
4. Salt Lake Mill (oak treads for stairway) 
5. Oscar Chytraus Co. (garage door) 
6. Formatop (kit. cabinet tops) 
7. Otto Buehner (fireplace hearth) 
8. Const. Spec. Co. (skylight) 
~ 9. Morrison Merrill Co. (carport beam) 
10. Heatrite Eng. Co. (GI flashings & sill covers) 
11. Builders .l\Iill (mill & farbicate redwood beams, labor only) 
12. Rulon Denney (break out old ftgs.) 
13. Frontier Oil & Sanzo Coal (hay & oil to protect concrete & 
thaw ground) 
14. S & R Found. Spraying (waterproofing) 
15. Menlove Const. Co. (final exc. of found., backfill & grueling 
Cat. costs) 
















17. Gibbons & Reed & l'iccl-E-Mix (total concreet mtls, ftg., 
found., flatwork) 
18. D. B . .Mitchell ( plwnher) 
19. Barnes Heating 
20. Barnes Electric (no lighting fixtures included) 
21. Fuller TrinH"iew (glass, windows & sliding doors) 
22. Durafloor (floor coyerings) 
23. Menlove Constr. (labor to lay floor tile basmt. apt.) 
24. Elias-Morris Co. (ceramic tile) 
25. Amherst Cabinet Co. (2 kitchens & linen closet) 
26. Fred Bleazard ( sheetrock, double laminated) 
27. "\Vestern Steel (angle irons) 
28. "\Vestern Steel ( ftg. & found. reinf arcing steel) 
29. Clark Roofing 
30. Martin Thompson & 2 employees (painting, labor only) 
31. Menlove Constr. (labor flat concrete) 
32. Menlove Const. (labor circular stairway) 
33. Menlove Constr. (labor to place, cut, handle & tie reinforcing 
steel in found.) 



















35. l\fenlove Constr. (labor to do brg. partitions, floor system, 
roof system, interior & exterior partitions) 
36. Menlove Constr. (labor for carport, cornice, window frames, 
balcony, work bench & concrete window wells) 
37. Menlove Const. (labor for front entry, window trim, railing, 
interior finish, paneling & hardware) 
38. Apex Lumber (all lumber, finish mtl., trim, doors, hardware 
& paint) 
39. Menlove Const. (Cat. cost to hoist concrete into found. & help 
move concrete trucks) 
40. Jos. Curtis & Sons (brickwork) 
""" o D. Retaining Wall, Hand Esc. and Hauling to Rear of House: 
1. Menlove Const. (labor & supervision) 
2. United Rent-All (post hole digger) 
3. Pole Line Supply Co. (wall anchors) 
4. Apex Lbr. (rerlwood wall mtl.) 
5. Menlove Const. (Cat. exc. & hauling) 
6. Menlove Const. (truck hauling soil) 
TOT AL CASH COST 
10';7r overhead & profit 













1,!')80. 7 4 
44. !)()fj .llH 
4. l<fHL_,..O 
' ~) - .. ';. ... -·". ; 
